New Physical Properties :: Science Chemistry Physics Papers

New Physical Properties Discussions about physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, etc., typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. The domain of physical properties would thus have been established once and for all. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. In the first section, I propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of this is used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Lastly, I examine certain interesting consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the above mentioned topics. I. Properties, Physical Properties, and New Physical Properties My aim here is to explore the hypothesis that there can be in the world, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. But, before doing it, we need to make clear the sense in which we are going to speak of properties, of physical properties and of the existence of new physical properties. A. Referential Expressions for Properties Strictly speaking, nominalizations and quotations are the usual procedures by means of which we get to construe referential expressions from the predicates of our languages. And it is through certain nominalizations, but not through quotations, that we get to construe from predicates something able to refer to properties. Which nominalizations would lead from predicates to referential expressions for properties? Consider a sentence like the following: 1. The sky has a salmon color. There are three possible kinds of nominalizations that we could construe involving all the elements presents in 1: 2. The sky that has a salmon color. 3. The having a salmon color the sky. 4. The salmon color of the sky. Here, the sky that has a salmon color is an object. And 2 is a referential expression for an object. Just for the same object which is referred by the subject of sentence 1. The having a salmon color the sky is an event. And 3 is a referential expression for an event. Finally, the salmon color of the sky is a property. And 4 is a referential expression for a property.